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CREATING AN INCLUSIVE POLITICAL ORDER
Guy-Uriel Charles†
The fundamental task for American democracy today is to create an
inclusive political order.
An inclusive order includes everyone. It fundamentally entails creating
a political and constitutional structure that takes seriously the right to vote
and assures that right is not undermined for any group, whether on the
basis of race, ideology, or geography. The future of voting rights law and
policy should focus on developing a new political and legal consensus in
which voting is regarded as a universal and fundamental right, made
available to all.
Throughout U.S. history, race and political power have long been
interrelated.1 Structural political inequality and structural racial inequality
have been mutually reinforcing, so solving racial discrimination in voting
will require a vigorous commitment to resolving political inequality—and
vice versa.2 In other words, commitment to political equality must include
a commitment to eradicating racial discrimination in voting. To eradicate
discrimination in voting and achieve real political equality, election law
must become centralized and nationalized. States should thus be
precluded from regulatory practices that undermine inclusiveness and
political equality.
In an inclusive political order, the current conception of state sovereignty
in setting election rules has no role to play. That current conception holds that
a state can effectively discriminate on the basis of race because the only way
to stop the state is by proving it acted on the basis of a racial motivation. 3
†
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1
See Vincent L. Hutchings & Nicholas A. Valentino, The Centrality of Race in
American Politics, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 383 (2004).
2
See Danyelle Solomon, Connor Maxwell & Abril Castro, Systematic Inequality and
American Democracy, CTR. FOR AM. PROG. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.
org/article/systematic-inequality-american-democracy/.
3
See Richard H. Pildes & Bradley A. Smith, Common Interpretation: The Fifteenth
Amendment, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments/
amendment-xv/interpretations/141.
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In effect, election law today allows a state to engage in a kind of legal
arbitrage in its election rules. If states can justify election rules on the basis
of politics or political ideology, even though these two things can be
interrelated with race, the Court will not say anything about what the state
has done. This practice must change. State governments should not regulate
the elections franchise in ways that keep it from being effective for anyone.
The franchise should be effective for all, and state governments should not
be allowed to change voting rules to make it harder for citizens to vote on
the basis of race, party, or other ideological grounds or impose other barriers
to political participation. Only then can the United States break free of the
ways in which structural political inequality and structural racial inequality
are intertwined.
Perhaps no other U.S. Supreme Court case as vividly presents the
important symbiotic relationship between structural political inequality and
structural racial inequality as does Gomillion v. Lightfoot, decided in 1960.4
In that case, the Supreme Court struck down on Fifteenth Amendment
grounds the Alabama legislature’s decision radically redrawing the electoral
district for the city of Tuskegee to exclude Black people from the voting
pool.5 A quick look back at that case helps map out the possibilities for
thinking about how to deal with racial discrimination today. This
examination can reveal insights about what is needed in the wake of efforts
by many recent state legislatures to regulate the voting process in ways that
purport to be based on grounds other than race, but which serve only to
reinforce structural racial inequality.
Gomillion posed an epistemic challenge for civil rights advocates. They
had to prove that the redrawing of the boundaries of Tuskegee was a racial
gerrymander—a segregation of the races—and not a political gerrymander
or simply a remapping of the municipal boundaries.6 A racial gerrymander
would have been unconstitutional, but a political gerrymander, or a mere
change in the municipal boundaries, was within the state’s sovereign power
under the law of the time.7
Although the state statute in Gomillion did not say anything about race,
or really anything other than latitude and longitude of the electoral district
for the city of Tuskegee, there was no doubt that the remapping of Tuskegee
was a blatant racial gerrymander.8 Sam Engelhardt, the state senator who
authored the statute in the Alabama legislature, was crystal clear about the
statute’s purpose.9 He said he wanted to exclude colored voters who might
become the balance of power in Tuskegee city elections.10
4

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
Id. at 347-48.
6
Id. at 346.
7
Id. at 342.
8
Id. at 341.
9
U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, NAT’L PARKS SERV., NAT’L HISTORIC LANDMARKS PROGRAM,
CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICA: RACIAL VOTING RIGHTS 38 (revised 2009).
10
Thomas Fortune, Black Citizens Boycott White Merchants for U.S. Voting Rights,
Tuskegee, Alabama, 1957-1961, GLOB. NONVIOLENT ACTION DATABASE (Nov. 9, 2011),
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But according to the existing legal doctrine of the time, state legislators’
motivations, as long as they did not appear evident in the terms of the statute,
were not a relevant consideration for ascertaining the constitutionality of the
statute.11 So, unless the plaintiffs could convince a court and the Supreme
Court to take motive into account, or that the redrawing of the lines was a
racial gerrymander, the courts would defer to Alabama, as they did in both
the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals in Gomillion.12 These
lower courts deferred to the state’s argument that, as long as the state was
not expressly engaged in racial discrimination, its sovereign right to
implement its own conception of political equality ought to be respected.
Although Gomillion’s lawyers did not have much admissible evidence
showing racial motivations, they did have the redrawn map showing the new
boundaries of Tuskegee.13 The map itself illustrated the egregiousness of
the state’s racial discrimination. 14 Look at the map, the civil rights
lawyers urged when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court. 15 The lines
of the map represented how Alabama removed almost every single
registered Black voter from the City of Tuskegee but not a single white
person, much less a white voter. 16 The jagged lines of the map made clear
that this was not a normal redrawing of the municipal boundaries. 17 After
being redrawn by the state legislature, Tuskegee had gone from basically
a large square to a much smaller 28-sided town.18 The new map removed
every single one but four or five Black registered voters from the confines
of the city.19 The state’s exclusionary purpose and effect was revealed by
the map.
Everyone knew what the state was doing: preventing Black people
from being able to register and to vote. 20 Tuskegee was a racial oligarchy.
Before the line redrawing, the majority population in Tuskegee was Black,
outnumbering white people five to one. 21 But white people held all the
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/black-citizens-boycott-white-merchants-usvoting-rights-tuskegee-alabama-1957-1961.
11
See Jo Desha Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961
SUP. CT. REV. 194, 196.
12
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405 (M.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd, 270 F.2d 594 (5th
Cir. 1959), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
13
Gomillion, 346 U.S. at 348.
14
See Tuskegee Redistricting Map, ENCYCLOPEDIA ALA., http://encyclopediaofalabama.
org/article/m-9742.
15
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U.S. 339 (Oct. 18,
1960) (No. 32).
16
Id. at 5.
17
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U.S. 339 (Oct. 19,
1960) (No. 32).
18
Gomillion, 346 U.S. at 340.
19
Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U.S. 339 (Oct. 19,
1960) (No. 32).
20
See William A. Elwood, An Interview with Charles G. Gomillion, 40 CALLALOO
576 (1989).
21
See C.G. Gomillion, The Tuskegee Voting Story, 6 CLINICAL SOCIO. REV. 22 (1988).
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political power. No Black people held an elected position at any level in the
city or county.22
Legally, the challenge for the plaintiffs’ lawyers in Gomillion was
getting around the state’s reliance on the theory of state sovereignty. That
theory shielded the state’s voting discrimination against its Black citizens
under the cloak of neutrality. 23 The state argued that the redrawing of
Tuskegee’s borders was just that: It was a map that drew new boundaries of
a subsidiary of the state.24 It did not separate the races upon its face. Alabama
even argued that lawsuits about political boundaries were nonjusticiable
because they raised questions that the federal courts did not have the power
to decide.25 The state’s arguments in Gomillion contained the seeds of what
has become the modern legal framework, in which the Court declared in
2019 that challenges to gerrymandering are now nonjusticiable. 26
Gomillion vividly reveals the symbiotic relationship between structural
political inequality and structural racial inequality. Alabama’s plan to remove
Black residents from Tuskegee was possible and submissible only because
the Constitution allowed the states to create unequal political units. The
Court had not been interpreting the Constitution to require states to create
political units that weighed votes equally. Instead, the Court had allowed
states to create oligarchies.
Alabama was thus subject to two different constitutional regimes: one
that required it to grant its citizens equal suffrage rights on the basis of race,
but another that allowed it to do whatever it wanted with citizens in its political
units. In the first, the state was regulated, and, in the second, it was unregulated.
Correspondingly, Black citizens were also subjected to two different types
of legal regimes. If they were categorized on the basis of their race, they were
entitled to equal suffrage rights. But if they were categorized by geography,
political unit, or political party, they could then be treated unequally.
These different regimes presented Alabama with an arbitrage opportunity.
The constitutional system would prevent Alabama from denying suffrage
rights to Black people, but would not prevent Alabama from favoring one
set of political units over another. Alabama could still achieve its racially
discriminatory aim—oppressing the voting rights of its Black citizens by
placing them in disfavored political units. The state simply needed to convince
the federal courts that the Constitution gave it the right to elect between two
different regulatory regimes. And so long as Alabama could shield its
racism behind the veil of state sovereignty, despite what everyone knew was
going on, Alabama could maintain both its racial and political oligarchy.
22

Fall 1964: A Groundbreaking Election in Tuskegee, ALA. HERITAGE (Oct. 25, 2014),
https://www.alabamaheritage.com/civil-rights-movement/fall-1964-a-groundbreakingelection-in-tuskegee.
23
Gomillion, 346 U.S. at 342.
24
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 346 U.S. 339 (Oct. 19,
1960) (No. 32).
25
Id. at 24.
26
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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But racial oligarchy and political oligarchy are intertwined, and it is hard
to have one without the other. In Gomillion, the question was whether the
federal courts were willing to go along. They almost did—until the case
reached the Supreme Court. The Court ultimately rejected the approach
taken in the lower courts and decided that the unconstitutional racial
purpose was evident from the map itself. 27 It held that the Fifteenth
Amendment barred the redrawing of Tuskegee’s boundaries in a way that
removed virtually all its Black voters. 28
Nevertheless, Gomillion demonstrates the challenge that plaintiffs face
today when bringing voting equality claims because of the legal system’s
default presumption of plenary and legitimate state power. The law in many
respects still views state authority as presumptively legitimate. 29 When the
state regulates on the basis of its authority to structure its local electoral
process, the courts tend to defer.30 In part, they do so because claims of
racial discrimination can raise significant epistemic uncertainties; the
questions can be very complicated. Is a voter ID requirement a racially
discriminatory device? Or is it simply the state deciding for itself what to
do with its local system?
Gomillion presented a multifaceted puzzle that has long bedeviled the
courts. How should constitutional law respond to the intersection of
structural racial and political inequality? Law and politics jurisprudence has
generally offered four approaches when confronted with structural political
and racial subordination.
The first approach is pure and unquestioned judicial deference to the state’s
supposed sovereign right to determine its voting rules and arrange its
electoral institutions in any manner consistent with the state’s values. This
total deference approach rarely acknowledges either racial inequality or
political inequality.
The second response is to acknowledge racial inequality but nevertheless
defer to the state on plenary power grounds.
The third approach defers to the state on the theory that any racial inequality
claim is, at bottom, a claim about political power and therefore
indistinguishable from a claim of unequal political power.
Lastly, there is the approach of race exceptionalism, which is the
argument that racial discrimination is an exception to the state’s plenary
powers. A state’s officials can do whatever they want, and the courts will
defer to them—except when they are engaged in racial discrimination. This
is the approach taken in Gomillion, where the Supreme Court decided that
clear racial discrimination violates the Constitution even where the state has
the right to structure its political framework in a manner it sees fit. 31
27

Gomillion, 346 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 346.
29
See Note, Let the End Be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of Heightened Scrutiny’s
Compelling—and Important—Interest Inquiries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1406 (2016).
30
Id. at 1411.
31
Gomillion, 346 U.S. at 346.
28
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There is, though, still a fifth possible approach. But this approach has
rarely found support in the courts. It concedes that structural racial inequality
and political oligarchy are mutually symbiotic. Both types of inequality grow
from each other, and the harm caused by one type is compounded by the
other. Precisely because the harms caused by both types are compounded by
their co-occurrence, they both require congressional or judicial oversight of
state electoral policies. This approach is the one I recommend.
It is also an approach reflected in the Voting Rights Act (VRA), which
was itself influenced by this idea that political equality and racial inequality
are intertwined.32 For 50 years, the VRA provided the regulatory framework
that placed the question of voting inequality at its center. 33 Even though the
Fifteenth Amendment was nominally the fundamental law of the land, the
VRA gave promise and life to the Fifteenth and the Fourteenth Amendments
and began to deliver on the implicit guarantees of self-rule under the Fourth
Amendment.34 The VRA brought the South into the fold of representative
democracy and signaled to the nation that a new era of both racial and
political equality was at hand. 35
That regime ended in 2013 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby
County v. Holder, in which the Court struck down Section 4(b) of the VRA,
the provision that identified the jurisdictions required to obtain
preclearance, and also sidelined Section 5 of the VRA, the provision that
required preclearance.36 Section 5 of the VRA said that any state or locality
subject to Section 4 had to preclear changes related to voting.37 The Court’s
decision in Shelby County, although not a surprise to voting rights experts,
ended a regulatory framework in which racial discrimination was placed
front and center in the regulatory firmament. From the Court’s perspective,
the VRA violated the conception of state sovereignty, the same basic idea
that it had earlier rejected in Gomillion.38
Shelby County thus effectively ended a regulatory regime that aimed for
political inclusiveness, and its aftermath led to the current deregulatory
world. The question, then, is where the United States ought to go from here?
The future of voting rights law should be grounded on full inclusivity and
equality. Everyone’s right to vote must be taken seriously—and conceptions
of state sovereignty have no role to play in such a future. Neither the public
nor the legal system should allow the government to regulate the franchise
in ways that diminish its efficacy.
32

Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
U.S. DEP’T JUST., C.R. DIV., SECTION 4 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT (updated May
5, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-rights-act.
34
See U.S. DEP’T JUST., GUIDANCE UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 52
U.S.C. 10301, FOR REDISTRICTING AND METHODS OF ELECTING GOVERNMENT BODIES 6
(Sept. 1., 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1429486/download.
35
BRIA 12 2 b Race and Voting in the Segregated South, CONST. RTS. FOUND., https://
www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-12-2-b-race-and-voting-in-the-segregated-south.
36
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537-38, 557 (2013).
37
Pub. L. No. 89-110 § 5, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
38
Id. at 544.
33
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We need to mobilize today around the vision of inclusivity in much the
same way that protest movements mobilized to bring about the VRA. Black
activists saw the VRA as a means to remake the racial order by remaking
the political order.39 That protest movement changed not only politics but
also constitutional law. The task in the post-VRA world is to take the lessons
learned—namely, that there is a strong relationship between racial hierarchy
and political oligarchy—and move forward toward a vision of a new world
of equality.
What does this new world look like? It looks like two new statutes
that have been proposed in Congress: the For the People Act and the
Freedom to Vote Act.40 If you look at the Freedom to Vote Act, for example,
it takes voting seriously as a fundamental right. It attempts to articulate
best practices in organizing inclusive elections and then nationalizes
those practices. 41 It undermines the conception of state sovereignty in
which the state has the right to create its political structure as it sees fit. It
recognizes that the right to vote belongs to citizens, so it makes certain
that everyone has access to practices such as early voting, mail voting, and
no-excuse absentee balloting.42 It prevents partisan gerrymandering, provides
remedies for vote certification, and modernizes voter registration. 43 It
recognizes the fundamental goal of making voting and political
participation an important aspect of democracy.
To move forward in the 21st century, society must recognize that political
equality and racial equality are mutually reinforcing and one cannot exist
without the other. Admittedly, the U.S. public is extremely divided today
and too many states are still engaged in discrimination on the basis of
voting—whether on the basis of partisanship, race, or a combination of the
two.44 And with current patterns of gerrymandering and redistricting in today’s
deregulatory environment, there are certainly reasons to be pessimistic.
But on the other hand, for the first time in a long time, a strong segment
of the population wants to tackle not just voting equality questions, but also
questions of electoral structures: the Electoral College, the composition of
the Senate, different ways of organizing an alternative voting system. 45
Voting Rights Act of 1965, NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE,
https://naacp.org/find-resources/history-explained/legislative-milestones/voting-rights-act-1965.
40
For the People Act of 2021, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021); Freedom to Vote Act, S.
2747, 117th Cong. (2021).
41
S. 2747 § 3(b)(1)(A).
42
S. 2747 § 2002(a).
43
S. 2747 § 5001(c)(3).
44
Michel Dimock & Richard Wike, America is Exceptional in the Nature of Its
Political Divide, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide/; Horus Alas, Report:
Republican-Led State Legislatures Pass Dozens of Restrictive Voting Laws in 2021, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 2, 2021, 11:14 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/
articles/2021-07-02/17-states-have-passed-restrictive-voting-laws-this-year-report-says.
45
Jane C. Timm, New Polls Suggest Broad Support for Democrats' Voting Rights Bills,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 30, 2021, 1:32AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/newpolls-suggest-broad-support-democrats-voting-rights-bills-n1277837.
39
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Today, all these issues are on the table. In addition, many jurisdictions have
adopted same-day registration, early voting, and other best practices that
make it easier for people to participate in elections.46 As a result, even
though there are surely reasons for despair today, thinking about how far
the United States has come in terms of political participation and
anticipating where it might be five, ten, or fifteen years down the road, well,
who knows? There is possibility for hope.
The question then becomes: How does the United States move beyond
the present deregulatory posture of federal law and build a social movement
for the purposes of making the legal change needed to ensure full
democratic inclusiveness? I see that we need to build a new movement
worthy of the civil rights movement that led in the mid-1960s to the Civil
Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act. It is ultimately up to us to make that
happen. It is up to us to move the ball forward to make political power and
representative democracy true for everyone and for all of us.

46

These 24 States Improved Access to Voting This Year, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Dec.
28, 2021), https://www.democracydocket.com/news/these-24-states-improved-access-tovoting-this-year/.

